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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2(3)(j) 
Utah Code Ann. 1996. See also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
However, this Court obtained jurisdiction when this appeal was poured-over form the Utah 
Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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IV. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This proceeding is an appeal from a Special Verdict in a jury trial presided over by 
the Honorable David Young. The trial court denied during the course of the trial a motion 
for mistrial and at the end of the trial a motion for a new trial made by the plaintiff/appellant. 
V. RELATED PRIOR APPEALS 
The are no prior appeals relating to this matter. 
VI. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Was it error for the trial court to allow the defendant physician, while 
testifying as an expert on his own behalf, to present an out of court hearsay opinion 
statement made by plaintiffs post operative oral surgeon, when the statement made did 
not relate to diagnosis or treatment? 
B. Did the trial court err in interfering with plaintiffs presentation of 
evidence, by commenting on the veracity of such evidence? 
C. Did the trial court err in instructing the jury, at the close of evidence that 
it could not find the defendant negligent merely because he sent an opinion letter to an 
insurance company recommending such surgery? 
D. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied a motion for a new 
trial and a motion for a mistrial? 
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VIII. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case 
This is an appeal from a Special Verdict handed down from a jury in a trial presided 
over by the Honorable David Young. Dorothy Schmidt, Appellant/Plaintiff sought damages 
for malpractice when Crayton Walker, M.D., Defendant/Appellee performed an unnecessary 
surgery and left Schmidt with insufficient facial bone. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Honorable David Young presided over a multi-day jury trial in which a special 
verdict was rendered by the jury concluding that the defendant, Crayton Walker, M.D., did 
not commit malpractice in performing surgery on the plaintiff. 
C. Summary of Relevant Facts 
On February 9, 1993 Plaintiff Dorothy H. Schmidt, aka Dottie, ("Schmidt") filed a 
complaint in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Plaintiff prayed for 
judgment against defendants Crayton R. Walker, M.D. ("Dr. Walker") and Dean B. Johnson, 
D.D.S.1 R. 1-10. 
Inter alia, the plaintiff alleged in the complaint that the defendant failed to take steps 
to accurately diagnose plaintiffs condition, erred in recommending radical treatment, and 
carried out surgeries and treatment which were incorrect. This left Schmidt with such a lack 
of bone in her face that she later had to have bone taken from elsewhere in her body and 
1
 Dr. Johnson settled with the plaintiff during the course of the trial. 
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implanted in her face, to give her a normal appearance. 
During 1988 and through July 1992, Dr. Johnson and Dr. Walker undertook to 
provide care and treatment for the Schmidt, who was suffering from difficulty masticating 
food due to facial and skeletal deformities. 
On the eve of trial Schmidt settled with Dr. Johnson (an orthodontist), leaving as the 
only trial defendant Dr. Walker, a dentist/physician. At trial and in this appeal the only 
parties are Schmidt and Dr. Walker. 
During the course of the trial, the court committed numerous errors, some of which 
were reversible and others of which had the cumulative effect of prejudicing Schmidt and 
preventing her from receiving a fair trial. Most glaringly, the trial court erred when it allowed 
defendant Dr. Walker to testify that Schmidt's post operative surgeon (from a different 
specialty) told him that in his opinion Dr. Walker was not guilty of malpractice. See Exhibit 
1 for copy of relevant transcript. At trial, counsel for the Schmidt objected to the testimony. 
R. 787, Tr. dated April 10, 1997, p. 250. The court over ruled the objection and permitted 
the defendant to testify. Id. 
Further, the trial court erred when it commented on evidence prior to its submission, 
and opined as to its relevance in the presence of the jury. See Exhibit 2 for copy of relevant 
dialogue. At trial, counsel for Schmidt properly took exception to the comments made by 
the trial court. R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p.221-26. The court heard arguments on 
a motion for a mistrial, denied the motion and permitted the trial to continue. Id. A motion 
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a motion for a mistrial, denied the motion and permitted the trial to continue. Id. A motion 
for a new trial was also denied. 
Judge Young also erred when he gave Jury Instruction Number 47, which was a 
statement directing them as to a factual matter which should have been determined by the 
jury, i.e., the court's opinion as to what motivated Dr. Walker to write the letter. In 
including this instruction, the trial judge presupposed and ruled on what jury could conclude 
from an important piece of disputed evidence. Counsel for Schmidt/appellant properly took 
exception to the jury instruction. R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p.99. The trial court 
allowed the instruction. 
Finally, Judge Young erred when he denied plaintiffs May 23, 1997 Motion for a 
New Trial R. 726-727. The cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced Schmidt and denied 
her a fair trial. 
On April 11, 1997 the jury returned a verdict that the defendant did not breach the 
applicable standard of care. R. 681. 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Schmidt asks this Court to consider the following arguments: 
A. The trial court erred when it ruled that the defendant physician, while 
testifying as an expert witness at trial, could present an out of court hearsay opinion 
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ultimate issue ot the case. 
B. The trial court erred when it stated to the jury in open court that a pre-
authorization letter written to an insurance carrier by the defendant recommending surgery 
of Schmidt was for pre-authorization only, and did not mean Dr. Walker was recommending 
surgery. 
(p. The trial court erred when it included Jury Instruction # 47. The instruction 
went to the heart of a pivotal piece of plaintiff s evidence that was a factual matter. 
p . The trial court erred when it denied plaintiffs motion for a new trial and 
motion for mistrial despite cumulative errors made by the court during the trial. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. WAS IT ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW DEFENDANT 
PHYSICIAN, WHILE TESTIFYING AS A TRIAL EXPERT, TO STATE THAT 
SCHMIDT'S POST-OPERATIVE ORAL SURGEON WAS OF THE OPINION 
THAT NO MALPRACTICE WAS COMMITTED? 
An understanding of this issue requires that the Court bear in mind that Judge Young 
had granted a pretrial motion2 by defendant Dr. Walker, precluding any expert testimony by 
a Dr. Wolford, a Texas oral surgeon who did the implant and other repair work on Schmidt's 
face in an attempt to remedy the alleged malpractice of Dr. Walker. Dr. Wolford, the non-
2
 The Motion in Limine excluding Dr. Wolford is discussed more fully later in this brief. 
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party subsequent surgeon, is a medical doctor specializing in oral surgery. The defendant 
Dr. Walker is a dentist. 
At trial Dr. Walker testified as an expert witness on his own behalf. During his 
testimony, he suddenly stated that he had spoken by telephone with Dr. Wolford, and that 
Dr. Wolford felt that no malpractice had been committed. Schmidt objected to such an out 
of court hearsay opinion statement made by another doctor about the ultimate issue in the 
case: did Dr. Walker commit malpractice? 
Defendant Dr. Walker as an expert witness testified, over objection, that Dr. Wolford, 
a post-operative oral surgeon, while preparing for a deposition in this matter, phoned Dr. 
Walker. Dr. Wolford (according to Dr. Walker) allegedly stated, inter alia, that Walker had 
not committed malpractice. 
At trial, Dr. Walker's counsel argued that the hearsay evidence was admissible as an 
exception under Rules 703 and 803(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and cited State vs. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1986) as precedent. Judge Young allowed the improper 
hearsay testimony. 
In order to preserve a contention of error in the admission of evidence for appeal, the 
appellant must raise a timely objection to the trial court in clear and specific terms. See State 
vs. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah 1982). At trial, counsel for Schmidt/appellant 
objected to the testimony. R. 787, Tr. dated April 10, 1997, p. 250. The court overruled the 
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objection and permitted the defendant Dr. Walker to tell the jury that another doctor had told 
him he had not malpracticed. Id. And the statement was allowed in without any meaningful 
restriction, able to be considered by the jury as substantive evidence offered for the truth of 
the declaration. 
"Whether a statement was made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment is a 
mixed question of law and fact." See Hansen vs. Heath, 822 P.2d 977,978 (Utah 1993). 
The standard of review for this issue depends on the particular ruling in dispute. Id. 978. 
This Court must weigh the clearly erroneous standard of factual findings against the 
correctness standard of finding admissibility under this rule. Id., at Note 3. Clearly, here the 
admissibility of the statement in question is of paramount importance. 
The appellant will first discuss the applicability of Rule 803(4), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, then the applicability ot Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence, the relevance of State 
vs. Schreuder, and finally the prejudicial nature of the error. 
1. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(4). Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence provides that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available: 
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing 
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain cr sensations, or the 
inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar 
as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. 
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Dr. Walker's counsel largely relied on this Rule to convince Judge Young that his report of 
a phone call with Dr. Wolford was admissible hearsay. However, the rule simply does not 
support admission of the testimony. 
Rule 803(4) was adopted verbatim from Federal Rules of Evidence 803(4). 
"Therefore, reference to federal cases and the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rules 
of Evidence 803(4) is pertinent to give meaning and effect to the Utah rule." See Hansen vs. 
Heath, 822 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1993). 
The rationale that formulates the basis for this exception is telling in describing its 
ultimate purpose. Basically, the patient has a strong motivation to be truthful about 
information that will form the basis of his diagnosis and treatment, making statements in this 
regard inherently trustworthy. See United States vs. Iron Shell, 633 F2d 77 (1980). 
Therefore, the purpose of the exception is to allow medical personnel to testify to 
information received from the patient or from others that assisted the personnel in their 
diagnosis and/or treatment of the patient. The rule certainly does not contemplate opinion 
testimony made by an out of court declarant oral surgeon as to the ultimate issue of the case, 
whether a dentist committed malpractice. 
Based on the above rationale, the Utah Supreme Court has considered two factors in 
determining the admissibility of statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment: (1) 
whether the statement was made with an intent to facilitate medical diagnosis or treatment; 
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and (2) whether the statement in fact was reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. See 
Hansen vs. Heath, 822 P.2d 977. 978 (Utah 1993). See also, United States vs. Iron Shell, 
633 F2d 77 (1980). This test mirrors the test formulated on the federal level. Id. See also, 
Advisory Committee Note, Fed.R.Evid. 803(4). 
The declarations can be of past or present symptoms, pain or sensations, or the 
general inception or general character of the cause of external source thereof The key is 
that the declaration must be "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." See State vs. 
Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Utah 1986). 
The rule does not contemplate opinion testimony made by an out of court declarant 
as to the ultimate issue of the c&se. And it certainly does not contemplate or give special 
status to comments professionals might make to one another in discussing litigation of the 
matter, once malpractice has already been claimed. 
For example, in applying the above test, the Federal District Court for the Southern 
District of California ruled that a "the declarant's motive must be consistent with the purpose 
of the rule and must be reasonable for the physician to rely on the information in diagnosis 
or treatment." Applying this test, that Eighth Circuit found that the defendant's statement 
was solely for litigation puiposes. There was no indication that his statements related in any 
way to diagnosis or for the purpose of treatment. Further, the court was concerned about the 
trustworthiness of the statement since the remarks made for purposes unrelated to diagnosis 
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or for treatment. United States vs. Renville, 779 F2d 430 (CA8 SD 1985). 
This is also true in the present case. The alleged statement made by the out of court 
declarant (Dr. Wolford) to the defendant (Dr. Walker) that the defendant did not commit 
malpractice3 was not "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" of the patient even in 
its broadest terms. The out of court declarant oral surgeon Wolford had previously 
diagnosed Schmidt, and treatment made by the out of court declarant had essentially ended. 
More important, the recipient of the information, Dr. Walker, had not been a treating 
physician for many years. Schmidt was not only no longer a patient of Dr. Walker's, but had 
been suing him for some time. For Rule 803(4) to take the declaration outside the scope of 
the hearsay rule (as Judge Young apparently ruled that it did) the statement would have to 
have been made to Dr. Walker to help him, the malpractice defendant, to treat or diagnose 
Schmidt. Nothing could be further from the fact. 
A sampling of rulings made by other Courts concerning the application of this 
exception where the out of court statement is made by one other than the patient is helpful 
in gauging whether a hearsay statement is made "pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." 
3
 The comment (assuming for present purposes that it was ever made, which Schmidt 
denies) by one doctor to another that malpractice was not committed is not surprising, since it 
may have been intended by Dr. Wolford to keep things pleasant between himself and Dr. Walker. 
It certainly could not have been intended to be something which would be taken and quoted and 
used as a professional opinion. If Dr. Walker had wanted to use an opinion by Dr. Wolford, he 
could have called him as a witness. Instead he got Judge Young to prohibit him from testifying, 
but then managed to get into evidence this one hearsay comment, thereby allowing the jurors to 
accept it at face value, and avoiding it being subject to cross examination. 
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In a prosecution of a defendant for felonious assault, the Ohio Appellate Court held 
that the victim's medical history and discharge summary were not admissible under Rule 
803(4) as statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, ruling that the 
exception reached "only statements of persons seeking the treatment or diagnosis, not out of 
court statements made by physicians as to the treatment prescribed or the diagnosis reached." 
State v. Irby, Slip Op. C.A. No. E-83-44 (1984, Ohio App. Erie Co)(available on Lexis).4 
Under this ruling even a statement limited to a medical issue (diagnosis) rather than a legal 
issue (malpractice) would be inadmissible, unless Dr. Walker continued to be a treating 
dentist and was to use the diagnosis in furtherance of his treatment. 
In Maine, in a prosecution of the defendant for murder, in which the defendant pled 
not guilty by reason of mental disease, the Supreme Court of that state held that a report 
consisting of the author's subjective evaluation of the defendant's personality as evidenced 
by his answers to a personality test was not admissible under 803(4).5 The court noted that 
the text of the rule made it quite clear that only the statements of the person being diagnosed 
or treated were excepted from the prohibition against hearsay. 
In a murder prosecution, the Texas Appeals court held that a statement made by a 
doctor as to the victim's blood type, which was based on a third person's testimony who 
4
 See also, Wilson vs. Zapata Off Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 1991). 
5
 State vs. Howard, 405 A2d 206 (Me. 1979). 
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himself was relying on a written report outside the view of the courtroom, was not admissible 
under 803(4).6 During a court recess a recess, the doctor had telephoned his office to obtain 
the information and then testified to that information during the course of the trial. 
Our courts have followed the same common sense logic in applying the 803(4) 
exception. In Hansen vs. Heath, previously cited herein, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
to qualify as an exception to the prohibition against use of hearsay testimony at trial a 
"statement made to a physician must have been made to facilitate medical diagnosis or 
treatment, and the statement must in fact be reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment." Hansen, supra, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah 1993) (emphasis supplied). 
At trial, in the instant case, over plaintiffs objection, counsel for defendant and 
defendant had the following dialogue during re-cross examination: 
0_. WHAT DID DR. WOLFORD TELL YOU WHEN HE CALLED 
YOU? 
A. DR. WOLFORD CALLED ME ON THE PHONE AFTER HE HAD 
RECEIVED NOTICE THAT HE WAS PROBABLY GOING TO HAVE HIS 
DEPOSITION TAKEN IN THIS CASE. WHICH WAS IN MARCH OF THIS 
YEAR. AND I WAS KIND OF SURPRISED, ACTUALLY, TO SEE THAT 
HE HAD CALLED ME, BECAUSE TO THIS POINT I HAD NOT TALKED 
TO DR. WOLFORD AT ALL ABOUT THIS CASE. 
£>. HAD YOU EVER MET HIM? 
A. NO. 
0_. GO AHEAD. 
A. AND WHAT HE TOLD ME WAS - IS THAT HE - FIRST OF ALL, 
HE WANTED TO KNOW SOME OTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS 
CASE, ESPECIALLY IF HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE HIS 
6
 Carrasquillo v. State, 742 SW2d 104 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1987) 
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DEPOSITION TAKEN. AND SO AT THAT POINT I SAID TO HIM, "DID 
YOU REALIZE THAT THIS PATIENT WHEN SHE CAME TO SEE ME, 
COMPLAINED OF BIMAXILLARY PROTRUSION, OF HAVING THE 
FACIAL APPEARANCE OF QUOTE LIKE A MONKEY, AND SHE HAD 
SIX MILLIMETERS OF OVERJET BETWEEN THE ANTERIOR 
MAXILLA AND MANDIBULAR TEETH? AND HE SAID NO. HE SAID, 
"I TOLD DOTTIE SCHMIDT WHEN SHE CAME TO SEE ME THAT 
THERE HAD NOT BEEN MALPRACTICE ON MY PART OR ANY OF 
THE CARE THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY - SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY 
RECEIVED, AS FAR AS HER ORTHODONTIC AND SURGICAL 
CARE. HE SAID, "I TOLD HER, I SAYS, WHAT YOU REQUESTED 
FROM DR. WALKER AND DR. JOHNSON IS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE 
OF WHAT YOU'RE NOW REQUESTING FROM ME." HE SAID. "TO 
MY KNOWLEDGE, AND WHAT I SEE OF YOUR RECORDS AND X-
RAYS", HE SAYS, "THERE HAS NOT BEEN MALPRACTICE 
COMMITTED HERE." 
Emphasis added. R. 787, Tr. dated April 10, 1997, p.250-252. It must be noted that Dr. 
Wolford, the out of court declarant, is not a medical doctor like Dr. Walker, but instead a 
Dentist, with a specialty in oral surgery. R.332. So they do not even share the same 
specialty. 
Since Walker's testimony is that Wolford told him that he told Schmidt something 
much earlier (that there was no malpractice), it is more accurately described as double 
hearsay of an unavailable declarant. 
The above dialogue between defendant and his counsel took place in the jury's 
presence, despite a court ruling (R.315-330) ordering that Dr. Wolford could not testify as 
an expert witness in this trial, nor could his deposition be used, unless he traveled to Utah. 
R372. It is interesting to note that the defendant used Dr. Wolford's hearsay testimony to 
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support his contention as to the ultimate issue of the case, but managed to get him excluded 
as an expert witness. Judge Young's ruling is not only in error, but it contradicts his own 
ruling that the individual quoted cannot be used as an expert.7 
The above testimony does not fall within the exception as outlined by Rule 803(4), 
or as interpreted by the Utah State Supreme Court as outlined in Hansen. First, the above 
testimony cannot be construed as a statement made by Dr. Wolford to Dr. Walker with an 
intent to facilitate medical diagnosis or treatment. Second, the statement was not reasonably 
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. It was, instead a conversation between two doctors 
comparing notes in anticipation of a deposition that one of the parties was about to give in 
a malpractice case. The intent of the conversation is not as important as the content itself. 
No objective reading of the above testimony could construe the conversation as an attempt 
to facilitate the treatment or the diagnosis of the patient\plaintiff. The treatment of Schmidt 
had ended prior to the conversation between the defendant and the oral surgeon, and long 
before the conversation between the two professionals, one a physician being sued and one 
a dentist specializing in oral surgeiy who was trying to avoid being deposed. 
7
 If Dr. Wolford were a proper witness from whom the jurors could obtain expert 
opinions, Schmidt could have offered many statements to the exact contrary made by Dr. 
Wolford. Obviously, fairness dictates that if Dr. Wolford were not to be allowed to give expert 
testimony, the same should be true as to both parties. The effective result is that his double 
hearsay statement was given more weight and strength (not subject to him swearing an oath, 
saying it himself or being cross examined) than whatever he would have said had he been a 
legitimate witness. 
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2. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 703. Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence was also argued to Judge Young as support for allowing the double hearsay. That 
rule establishes the bases of opinion testimony by experts: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or 
made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts known to the experts in the 
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. 
Rule 703 was adopted verbatim from Federal Rules of Evidence 703. See Advisory 
Committee Note, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 703. Therefore, reference to federal cases 
and the Federal Advisory Committee Note are pertinent.8 
The trial court has wide discretion in determining admissibility of expert testimony, 
and such decisions are reviewed under abuse of discretion standard. Under this standard, the 
Court of Appeals will not reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability. See 
State vs. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. Ct. 1998). It is suggested, however, that 
this was not purely an issue of admitting expert testimony: the "expert" testifying was Dr. 
Walker, the defendant. Rule 703 may govern whether he or even Dr. Wolford is qualified 
to testify as an expert, but not whether the substantive content of the unsworn statement by 
one made to the other as to an ultimate issue may be shared carte blanche with the jurors, 
as if Wolford were another expert there to enlighten them. 
8
 See Hansen vs. Heath, 822 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1993). 
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But even under Rule 703, Judge Young clearly abused its discretion in allowing a 
defendant/expert witness to testify to an out of court opinion by another specialist in a 
different field as to the ultimate issue for the triers of fact. The testimony was hearsay and 
should not have been allowed. This is true a fortiori since at trial (per a defense request) 
Judge Young ruled that Dr. Wolford could not testify as an expert witness. R.372. 
It is true that under the right circumstances experts may testify as to the ultimate issue 
of a case. See Utah Rules of Evidence 704. It is also established that an expert, in 
supporting his opinion, may rely on outside sources to held form that opinion. See Utah 
Rules of Evidence 703. However, stating opinion testimony of an out of court declarant 
during trial as to the ultimate issue is strictly hearsay. 
It's like saying, "he said I did not commit malpractice. So, jury, it must be so." If this 
were proper evidence then malpractice defendants could call their various colleagues on the 
phone, recite the defense version of the facts, after which they would often be reassured by 
the colleague that there was no malpractice. The defendant doctor could then choose the 
colleagues who were most supportive and had the best credentials, and present their out of 
court statements to the jury as additional witnesses. This would be a great advantage, since 
the defense could limit the hearsay to the most helpful statements, avoid cross examination 
and avoid the expense of having the hearsay "witnesses" actually review records or 
investigate a case, and then come to testify. But the effect on a jury of laymen would be as 
Schmidt v. Walker, Appellant's Brief Page 19 of 37 
if a parade of experts supported the self-serving testimony of the defendant. 
The Advisory Committee Note is instructive in determining what type of data an 
expert may rely on in ascertaining his opinion. 
Advisory Committee Note - This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and 
expands Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), which limited facts or 
data not personally known to the expert to those made known to him at the 
hearing. The provisions that the facts or data upon which the expert relies 
for his opinion in a particular field may be of the type "reasonably relied 
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions," and need not 
otherwise by admissible also seems to expand Rule 56(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
(emphasis added). See Advisory Committee Note, Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 703. 
Emphasis in the Note exclusively dictates that the expert may rely upon "facts or data" in 
formulating his opinion. Relying on the opinion of an out of court declarant is not 
mentioned. 
In State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982) the Utah Supreme Court outlined what 
type of :facts or data an expert may legitimately rely upon in forming an opinion. "[T]he 
witness may base his opinion on reports, writings or observations not in evidence which were 
made or compiled by others, so long as they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in that field." Id at 725. The out of court declarant's statements that the defendant did not 
commit malpractice falls well outside the definition stated in Clayton. 
This analysis was echoed by the Utah Supreme Court in Schreuder, which reiterated 
that the test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony is whether this "particular 
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fact [is] one that an expert in this particular field would be justified in relying upon in 
rendering his opinion:' State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case, the defendant/expert witness testified to the ultimate issue of the 
case by, inter alia, using opinion testimony from an out of court declarant concerning the 
ultimate issue. Dr. Wolford, a dentist/oral surgeon, opined, according to defendant/expert 
witness Dr. Walker, that defendant Walker himself, a medical doctor, had not committed 
malpractice. R. 787, Tr. dated April 10, 1997, p.250-252. This testimony by the defendant 
is inadmissible because it is an opinion by an out of court declarant going to the heart of the 
matter, i.e. did the defendant commit malpractice. The opinion of the out of court declarant 
is not a factual statement, nor is it data upon which an opinion may be based by the in-court 
declarant. A dentist cannot testify (directly or through hearsay) as to whether the conduct 
of a doctor meets the standard of care for that field; nor visa versa. 
There is broad support from other states validating the view that an expert is not 
permitted to testify to hearsay matters forming the basis of the expert's opinion, where the 
hearsay matters are the opinion of another expert. A California Appellate Court held that the 
trial court had correctly precluded testimony by an expert concerning the content of two 
reports prepared by the expert's subordinates, since the subordinates were themselves experts 
and their reports constituted expert opinion.9 
9
 Continental Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 216 Cal. App. 3d. 388 (2nd Dist 
1989). 
Schmidt v. Walker, Appellant's Brief Page 21 of 37 
The Virginia Supreme Court held that hearsay matters of opinion on which an expert 
bases an opinion are not admissible as establishing the basis of the expert's opinion, even if 
the expert's opinion is admissible, and if the hearsay matters are of a type normally relied 
on by expert in testifying expert's field.10 The court based this ruling on the rationale that the 
admission of hearsay expert opinion without the testing safeguards afforded by cross 
examination is fraught with overwhelming unfairness to the opposing party. No litigant in 
our judicial system, continued the court, is required to contend with the opinion of absent 
experts whose qualifications have not been established to the satisfaction of the court, whose 
demeanor cannot be observed by the trier of fact, and whose pronouncements are immune 
from cross-examination. McMunn, supra, 379 S.E.2d 908 (Va. 1989). See also, Ake v. 
State, 778 P.2d 460 (Okla.Crim.1989); Beahm v. Shortall, 368 A.2d 1005 (Md. 1977), and 
People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485 (111.1986). 
3. State v. Schreuder. The third and final argument Dr. Walker's trial 
counsel used to convince Judge Young that his client should be able to tell the jury that 
another doctor says he is not guilty of malpractice, is State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215 
(Utah 1986). But it is of no more help to Dr. Walker. 
As it relates to this case, Schreuder stands for the proposition that expert witness 
10
 McMunn v. Tafum, 379 S.E.2d 908 (Va. 1989). 
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testimony concerning the expert's interview with his patient, which formed the basis of the 
expert's opinion that the patient was under the influence of a third party when the patient 
committed a crime, was admissible hearsay. Id, at 1222. 
Counsel for the defendant/expert witness Dr. Walker cited Schreuder in rebuttal to 
Schmidt's objection that the defendant/expert witness could not testify to hearsay basis 
consisting of the opinion of an out of court expert. R. 787, Tr. dated April 10, 1997, p.250. 
Based on this argument, or one of the others disposed of above, Judge Young allowed the 
statement. 
Use of Schreuder for the proposition that Dr. Walker can testify as to what he claims 
Dr. Wolford told him misstates the ruling in Schreuder. In that case, the defendant objected 
to statements made to a psychiatrist by his patient, a third party. The State was attempting 
to establish a nexus between the crime and the defendant by showing that the patient was 
under the influence of the defendant when he committed an act of murder. The psychiatrist, 
the in-court declarant, was allowed to relate the bases upon which he formed his opinion. 
He related family histoiy, observations of the patient and a tape conversation. The trial court 
tightly controlled the psychiatrist's testimony. Schreuder at 1223. The bases for the witness' 
testimony was well supported. 
In this case, the objectionable testimony is comprised of out of court declarant 
statements concerning whether the defendant/expert witness committed malpractice. These 
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statements are of a different breed than statements made in Schreuder. Where the Court in 
Schreuder allowed facts and data (most of it from the defendant herself) to support expert 
testimony, the Court here allowed opinion testimony of an out of court declarant as to the 
ultimate of issue of the case. Clearly the testimony is distinct. Testifying as to matters of 
opinion on which the defendant/expert witness basis an opinion are not admissible in 
establishing an expert witness' opinion. 
4. Prejudicial nature of the error. We have some insight into the 
prejudicial nature of the error at hand. When asked on the Special Verdict Form the 
question: "Did Dr. Walker breach the applicable standard of care?" the juror response was 
an overwhelming no. R. 681. In the instant case, the effect of admitting the alleged opinion 
of the out of court absent declarant was to present to the jury a statement prejudicial to 
Schmidt, without affording Schmidt the opportunity to cross-examine the out of court 
declarant, or giving the jury an opportunity to observe the out of court declarant. This 
unfairness essentially allowed the defendant the luxury of submitting an out of court opinion 
as to the ultimate issue of the case without examination. By its very nature, it is prejudicial. 
Judge Young erred when he allowed the defendant/expert witness to testify to matters 
forming the basis of the expert's opinion, since he purported to base his own opinion on that 
of an out of court declarant. This appears to have been a ruse to sneak in the testimony of 
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an expert not listed and not present, and who had actually been excluded as a witness. 
An expert may testify to facts and data that he/she applied in reaching his/her opinion, 
but not to the opinion of an out of court witness. Without the opportunity to cross examine 
the out of court declarant, the trial court exposed the jury to highly prejudicial testimony to 
be considered by the jury. 
B. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR BY INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF'S 
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE, BY COMMENTING ON THE VERACITY OF 
SUCH EVIDENCE? 
Judge Young erred when he stated to the jury in open court that a pre-authorization 
letter written to an insurance carrier by the defendant recommending surgery of Schmidt was 
for pre-authorization only. The statement went to the heart of the matter: whether defendant 
Dr. Walker recommended an unnecessary surgery. A key exhibit in Schmidt's case to show 
that Dr. Walker recommended the surgery was Exhibit D-69, a letter written by Dr. Walker 
to her health insurance carrier seeking pre-authorization of the surgery later performed. 
However, Judge Young emasculated the effect of the letter by his comment to the jury. 
At the time the Court made the statement in front of the jury, the motivation for 
writing the letter was not yet in evidence. Yet he in effect opined for the jury on what Dr. 
Walker must have been thinking when he wrote it (that it was only for insurance purposes, 
not because he really thought Schmidt needed the surgery). It was highly prejudicial in that 
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he laid out before the jury the defendant's defense, i.e., the defendant/physician did not 
really mean what he said in the letter. The Trial Court effectively and succinctly became an 
advocate for the defense in determining the motivation for writing the letter. 
Propriety of supplemental jury instructions presents a question of law, which the 
Court of Appeals reviews under a correction of error standard.11 In order to preserve a 
contention of error for appeal, the appellant must raise a timely objection to the trial court 
in clear and specific terms. See State v. McCardell, supra. At trial, counsel for 
Schmidt/appellant properly took exception to the comments made by the trial court. R. 788, 
Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p.221-26. The court heard arguments on a motion for a mistrial, 
denied the motion and permitted the trial to continue. Id. 
1. The trial judge prejudiced the rights of Schmidt to a fair, impartial trial. "In 
a jury trial, the trial judge must be fair to both sides, and the extent to which he may go in 
making comments and remarks during trial is governed by the fundamental principle that 
nothing should be said or done which will prejudice the rights of the litigants. The judge 
should refrain from any remarks that are calculated in any way to influence the minds 
of the jurors." See 35 A.L.R.5th 1 (1996). Emphasis added. 
Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part that "[t]he court shall not 
11
 See State v. Clements, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App. 1998), see also, Laws v. 
BlandmgCity, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App. 1995). 
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comment on the evidence in the case and if the court states any of the evidence it must 
instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact." Id. 
At trial in the instant case, the following dialogue took place between plaintiffs 
counsel, defense counsel and the Trial Court, in front of the jury, concerning the letter 
(Trial Exhibit D-69), as to the motivation for its drafting. The dialogue is best understood 
if it is noted that for whatever reason, Judge Young was operating under the mistaken 
assumption that Schmidt's dental insurance was about to expire. This assumption was not 
based on any evidence in the case, and in fact was not true. The dialogue is as follows: 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO MAKE ANY 
COMMENTS, COUNSEL, IN RELATION TO THE LETTER? 
MR. JENSEN: WELL -
MR. RENCHER: LET MAKE THE COMMENT: THERE 
HAS BEEN EVIDENCE THROUGHOUT THIS TRIAL THAT 
SHE HAD FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO MAKE CHOICES IN 
REGARD TO HER DENTAL CARE. AND THAT 
FINANCIAL PRESSURE WAS THE THING THAT 
MOTIVATED THE LETTER. 
MR. JENSEN: WELL, YOU HONOR, I - MAY I TAKE 
EXCEPTION TO THAT FROM THE EVIDENCE? 
THE COURT: YOU CAN TAKE EXCEPTION HOWEVER 
YOU WANT, MR. JENSEN. THE LETTER WAS 
MOTIVATED - YOU'RE THE ONE THAT BROUGHT 
THIS UP, SO TAKE ALL THE EXCEPTIONS YOU 
WANT, AND JUST STATE WHAT YOU WANT. BUT 
THE LETTER WAS MOTIVATED BECAUSE SHE HAD 
A BELIEF THAT HER INSURANCE COVERAGE WAS 
GOING TO TERMINATE AT A CERTAIN TIME. AND 
THAT TERMINATION CAUSED HER TO WANT TO BE 
SURE THAT THIS CONDITION WOULD BE COVERED 
UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
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MR. JENSEN: YOUR HONOR, MAY I RESPECTFULLY 
TAKE THE STRONGEST EXCEPTION I CAN THAT THERE 
IS NO EVIDENCE OF THAT FACT. 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU WILL HAVE TO ARGUE IT. 
BUT THE LETTER WAS MOTIVATED FOR THE 
PURPOSE OF OBTAINING A PRIOR APPROVAL 
FROM THE INSURANCE COMPANY. IS THAT 
CORRECT, MR. JENSEN? 
MR. JENSEN: NO, THAT IS NOT CORRECT. 
THE COURT: WHO WAS IT WRITTEN TO? 
MR. JENSEN: TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY BY DR. 
WALKER. THERE IS NO SUCH EVIDENCE THAT THAT 
WAS HIS MOTIVATION OR MS. SCHMIDT'S 
MOTIVATION. 
THE COURT: THE MOTIVATION OF THE PARTIES MAY 
REMAIN A FACT IN DISPUTE. I WILL LET YOU DEAL 
WITH THAT. YOU CAN DEAL WITH THAT THROUGH 
THE WITNESSES. NEVERTHELESS, SHE ASKED HIM, 
AFTER THE ONE VISIT WITH HIM IN SEPTEMBER -
IN NOVEMBER SHE ASKED HIM TO WRITE THE 
LETTER TO GET PRIOR APPROVAL FOR THAT 
SURGERY AND THAT LETTER WAS TO HER 
INSURANCE COMPANY. 
MR. JENSEN: YOU HONOR, WE NEED TO ADDRESS A 
MATTER TO THE COURT. 
Emphasis added. R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p.21-23. Evidence produced at trial, to 
that point, had not addressed the motivation for the letter. The Trial Court with this dialogue 
clearly clothed the defendant's theory in the robes of court legitimacy. After the jury was 
excused, Schmidt sought a mistrial, arguing that the jury was tainted by the remarks of the 
judge. The trial judge denied the motion and the trial continued. R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 
1997, p.25-26. 
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The trial court reasserted his error when he allowed Jury Instruction Number 47 to be 
submitted the jury. The Instruction in essence told the jurors that they did not have to 
conclude from a letter sent by the defendant to the plaintiffs insurance carrier recommending 
surgery, that defendant Walker was really recommending the surgery; that defendant really 
did not intend to perform it. R.672. This once again prejudiced the jury as to the main 
contention of the plaintiff, i.e., that defendant performed an unwarranted surgery. 
In Laws v. Blanding, supra, this Court ruled that a "[p]laintiff has a right to have his 
theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way, and the trial court 
has a duty to instruct the jury on the applicable law." Id. at 1085.12 This was not the case 
here. By including theories of defense prior to submission of evidence, the judge effectively 
argued the case for the defense in the presence of the jury. At that point, the trial court 
entered the fray as an advocate and did not maintain its status as a neutral referee. Although 
the trial court, after admonition from the plaintiff, instructed the jury to ignore his comment 
as to what the motivation and objective was in sending the letter, the damage had been done. 
R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p.27. 
2. Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled similarly. Reversing a judgment against 
the plaintiff-counter defendant, an Illinois appeals court concluded that by making comments 
12
 In Blanding, this Court reversed and remanded the case stating that the judge, by 
allowing an erroneously incomplete jury instruction, had committed reversible error. Id. at 1086. 
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concerning the credibility of plaintiff's witnesses, the trial judge invaded the province of the 
jury and could have influenced the jury's assessment of the witness and the credibility of his 
testimony.13 
A New York appeals court, in a wrongful death action against a hospital, reversed the 
judgment against the defendant, observing that the nature of the questioning by the trial court 
immediately after its ruling striking the opinion from the record "evinced the trial judge's 
disbelief in the defense's case."14 
Also, in New York, an appeals court ruled the judge's disparaging remarks during eye 
witness testimony as to the ultimate issue demanded a new trial. The court concluded that 
the remarks concerning the witness may have affected the jury's assessment of the witness' 
credibility in its verdict.15 
A Missouri appellate court ruled that it was improper for a trial judge to indicate any 
opinion on an issue of fact, the merits of the case ,the credibility of witnesses, the sufficiency 
of the evidence, or other similar matters.16 During closing of arguments of that case, the 
plaintiffs attorney referred to a witness as an advocate for the insurer, whereupon the trial 
court sustained an objection to that characterization, observing that thought the witness was 
13
 Pavilonv. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245 (lstDist. 111. 1990). 
14
 Serota v. Kaplan, 511 NYS2d 667 (2nd Dept. 1987). 
15
 Heiney v. Pattillo, 428 NYS2d 513 (2nd Dept. 1980). 
16
 Noltingv. Petersen, 404 S.W.2d 410 (Mo. App. 1966). 
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an insurance agent, he had nothing to with the insurer. The appeals court noted that this was 
an opinion of the court and not within proper role of the judge. Id. 
These cases stand for the proposition that remarks made by a judge during a jury trial 
that disparage the subject matter of the litigation may prejudice the outcome. It is the trial 
court's duty not to do or say anything that might leave his impression as to the outcome of 
the case. 
3. Requiring a new trial. To require a new trial, a Utah appellate court must 
conclude not only that trial court erred, but that the error was prejudicial; that is, that the 
error tended to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party, or insufficiently 
or erroneously advised jury on the law.17 This prejudicial error rises to the standard as 
expressed in SummerilL In the instant case, before either party had the opportunity to submit 
into evidence the motivation behind an important piece of evidence, the trial judge tainted 
the jury by injecting his own belief as to the matter. His two sentence jury instruction, after 
the fact, did not remove from the jury's mind his assessment of the fact pattern. Later, 
during trial, it was brought out through testimony that the two sides conflicted as to this 
important fact.18 Clearly, the judge's biased remarks tended to mislead the jury and 
17
 Summerillv. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1044 (Utah App. 1995) 
18
 Dr. Walker claimed that the letter was not really intended as a recommendation of 
surgery (he claimed he was talked into it by Schmidt, and didn't really think it was necessary), but 
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prejudiced the plaintiffs case. 
C. DID THE COURT ERR BY GIVING INSTRUCTION #47, THAT IT COULD 
NOT FIND DEFENDANT NEGLIGENT BECAUSE HE SENT AN OPINION 
LETTER TO AN INSURANCE COMPANY RECOMMENDING SURGERY? 
The lower court erred when in it included Jury Instruction #47. The instruction went 
to the heart of a pivotal piece of plaintiff s evidence. The intent and the motivation of the 
letter was disputed. See discussion above. The jury instruction itself was a statement of a 
factual matter that should have been determined by the jury, i.e., why was the letter written. 
In including this instruction, the trial judge presupposed and ruled on an important piece of 
evidence that was disputed. 
Propriety of jury instructions presents a question of law, which the Court of Appeals 
reviews under a correction of error standard. See State v. Clements, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(Utah App. 1998), see also, Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah App. 1995). In 
order to preserve a contention of error for appeal the appellant must raise a timely objection 
to the trial court in clear and specific terms. See Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
At trial, counsel for the plaintiff/appellant properly took exception to the jury instruction. 
R. 788, Tr. dated April 11, 1997, p. 99. 
was simply an attempt to lock in Schmidt's condition as a pre-existing condition, since she was 
about to lose her insurance Schmidt strongly disagreed, and testified that Walker recommended 
the surgery There was no impending loss of insurance, as was shown by her testimony and the 
coverage evidence 
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The following Jury Instruction was submitted to the jury at the end of closing 
arguments over objection from plaintiff Schmidt's counsel: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 47 - You may not find Dr. Walker 
negligent or at fault merely because he prepared and sent a letter 
at plaintiffs request to her health insurance company to see if 
her insurance would pay for surgery for Dottie Schmidt's pre-
existing dental condition before her insurance expired. You also 
need not conclude that at the time he sent the letter at plaintiffs 
request that he had desired to perform surgery on her. 
R. 672. 
Plaintiffs main theory of liability was that the defendant performed an unnecessary 
surgery. Part of the evidence that supported this theory was a letter that Dr. Walker wrote 
to the plaintiffs insurance company recommending surgery. Plaintiff submitted the letter 
as to the truth that it asserted: that defendant Dr. Walker recommended that she undergo the 
surgery for which she later sued. Dr. Walker, though, claimed that he wrote the letter for 
insurance purposes only, and that he had no intent to perform the surgery. By submitting the 
jury instruction, the trial court ruled on the significance of a key piece of evidence. The 
determination as to the amount of weight to assign the letter was a factual issue for the jury 
to decide. 
"To require a new trial, we must also conclude the error was prejudicial, i.e., that it 
'tend[ed] to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or 
erroneously advise[d] the jury on the law." See Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 
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(UtahApp. 1995). 
The instruction misled the jury. Its contention that you could not find fault "just 
because he wrote the letter" and that you need not conclude that "at the time he wrote the 
letter at plaintiffs request that he had decided to perform surgery" was exactly the question 
that the plaintiff was asking the jury to decide. This was a hotly disputed issue, and yet 
Judge Young strongly alluded (at least) what the jury should or should not conclude from the 
letter, and did so in a way which lent legitimacy to the defense theory of the case. Based 
perhaps on the trial judge's own experience as to the puipose and effect of letters of pre-
authorization from health care providers to insurers, he drew conclusions for the jury which 
nullified any beneficial effect the letter would otherwise have provided for Schmidt. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted, "It is error to find an instruction if there is no 
evidence to support it and if it could be misleading."19 By including this jury instruction, the 
jury was misled in the belief that this important piece of evidence had already been 
concluded. 
D. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
MOTIONS FOR A NEW TRIAL AND FOR A MISTRIAL? 
The lower court erred when it denied plaintiffs motions for a new trial and for a 
mistrial. Because of the cumulative effect of the errors stated herein, the plaintiff was 
19
 State v. Stcmdiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264 (Utah 1988) 
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prejudiced and could not receive a fair trial. 
The appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision denying a new trial 
and/or mistrial unless their is a clear abuse of discretion. State vs. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 
(UtahApp. 1998). 
When deciding a motion for a mistrial or for new trial, the trial court must determine 
whether the problematic incident in question may have or probably did influence the jury, 
to the prejudice of the complaining party.20 
Using the above standard, the Supreme Court has held previously that admission of 
expert testimony as to veracity of a victim was reversible error.21 The Supreme Court also 
determined that the lack of jury instructions on consequences of a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity and guilty of mentally ill was reversible error.22 Further, jury instructions 
were held prejudicial when the instruction included a mandatoiy presumption.23 
In this case, the trial court allowed an expert witness to testify as to the ultimate issue 
of the case, employing hearsay opinion of an out of court declarant, he commented as to 
important evidence and to its weight in front of the jury, and allowed a jury instruction which 
20
 State v. Robertson 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). See also, State v. Hay, 859 
P.2d 1,7 (Utah 1993). 
21
 State v. Bates, 784 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1989). 
22
 State v. Shickles, supra, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1987). 
23
 State v. Tarafor, 720 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1987). 
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pre-empted and pressumed the meaning, intent and effect of a critical piece of evidence. 
Despite an attempt at a curative instruction during trial, the cumulative effect of the 
errors constitutes reversible error. The very fact that the lower court submitted Jury 
Instruction Number 47 negated any cure the verbal instruction may have had. 
X. CONCLUSION 
AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
"For purposes of determining whether a mistrial should have been granted, our 
overriding concern is [whether] the [complaining party] received a fair trial." State v. 
Harmon, at 276. 
In the instant case, allowing hearsay (from a witness whose testimony had already 
been ruled to be unusable at trial), commenting as to the weight of evidence and allowing an 
improper jury instruction marred the jury's ability to be impartial and prevented plaintiff 
from receiving a fair trial. For these reasons the trial court abused its discretion in not 
granting plaintiffs motions for a mistrial and/or for a new trial. 
It is requested therefore, that the Court reverse the trial judge's decision, and remand 
this case with instructions to convene a new and fair trial, with costs to Appellant Schmidt. 
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Respectfully submitted this 21st day of December, 1998. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Thomas E. Stamos 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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•"HAT WE NEEDED TO HAVE A MEETING WITH DR. BALDWIN TO 
&T LEAST GO OVER WHERE WE STARTED WITH DOTTIE, WHERE 
*TE ENDED UP, WHAT OUR X-RAYS, WHAT OUR STUDY MODELS 
SHOW, SO THAT HE HAD A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THIS 
"ASE. 
AND SO DR. JOHNSONI ARRANGED FOR US TO 
HAVE A MEETING BETWEEN MYSELF, BETWEEN DR. JOHNSON 
AND BETWEEN DR. BALDWIN. AND IN THAT MEETING, TO 
THAT POINT I'D NEVER TALKED TO DR. BALDEIN, NEVER 
MET HIM. I DIDN'T KNOW HIM, BECAUSE HE WAS NEW IN 
SALT LAKE. 
Q. WERE YOU HAVING A MEETING IN ORDER TO 
PRESSURE HIM AGAINST DOING SOMETHING OR BECAUSE 
THERE'S A PROFESSIONAL DUTY TO ADVISE ANOTHER 
SURGEON AS TO THE CARE THAT HAS BEEN RENDERED, OR 
SOMETHING IN BETWEEN? 
A. I THOUGHT THAT BEFORE DR. BALDWIN GOT 
INVOLVED IN THIS, THAT HE AT LEAST OUGHT TO KNOW 
WHERE WE STARTED, WHERE WE ENDED UP, AND WHAT 
TREATMENT WAS PROVIDED FOR THIS PATIENT. 
AS FAR AS WHAT DR. BALDWIN WOULD DO, 
OR WHETHER HE WOULD TREAT THE PATIENT, WHETHER HE 
WOULDN'T TREAT THE PATIENT, THAT WAS TOTALLY HIS 
DECISION. 
Q. DID YOU INTIMIDATE, COERCE, CONVINCE, 
2L4J3 
1 PRESSURE OR SUGGEST THAT HE NOT DO WHATEVER HE 
2 PROFESSIONALLY THOUGHT HE OUGHT TO DO? 
3 A. NO. I DON'T SEE HOW I COULD INTIMIDATF DR. 
4 "BALDWIN. I'D NEVER MET HIM BEFORE.. BUT, NO, I 
5 DIDN'T DO THAT. 
6 Q. DID YOU HEAR FROM DR. KEITH LIGNELL? 
7 A. YES, I DID. 
8 Q. AND DID HE CALL YOU OR DID YOU CALL HIT? 
9 I A. HE CALLED ME. 
10 Q. THIS WAS DOTTIE'S UNCLE? 
11 A. THAT'S WHAT I FOUND OUT THROUGH THE 
12 TELEPHONE CALL. 
13 Q. WHAT DID HE TELL YOU? 
14 A. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS UNFORTUNATELY GOING 
15 TO HAVE TO BE INVOLVED WITH THIS CASE, AND HE DIDN'T 
|16 REALLY WANT TO GET INVOLVED WITH THIS CASE. AND I 
17 I WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR FROM HIM, AND BECAUSE HE 
J18 HADN'T-- I DIDN'T SEE -- I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND ANY WAY 
b THAT HE WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
BO AND HE SAID THAT HE WAS -- I THINK 
El DOTTIE'S --HE WAS SOMEHOW DISTANTLY RELATED TO 
12 DOTTIE THROUGH HIS WIFE, WHICH I DIDN'T KNOW EXACTLY 
|3 HOW. THAT HE HAD BEEN TO A CHRISTMAS PARTY AND MADE 
|4 THE COMMENT THAT HE THOUGHT DOTTIE HAD AN UPPER 
15 DENTURE. 
2A3 
1 AND I SAYS, "WELL, THAT'S INTERESTING 
2 THAT YOU WOULD SAY THAT." AND HE SAYS, "YEAH." AND 
3 I SAYS, "WHY DID YOU SAY THAT?" AND HE SAID, 
4 BECAUSE I HAD DOTTIE AS A PATIENT WHEN SHE WAS 
5 YOUNGER, AND SHE HAD BAD DENTAL DECAY, MULTIPLE 
6 FILLINGS." 
7 AND HE SAID, GIVEN WHAT I SAW WHEN SHE 
8 WAS YOUNGER VERSUS NOW, HE SAID, GIVEN HER BAD 
9 DENTAL HISTORY, HE SAID, "I THOUGHT SHE PROBABLY 
10 WOULD HAVE, BY NOW, HAD ALL HER UPPER TEETH 
11 EXTRACTED. SO I THOUGHT IT WAS, YOU KNOW, I DIDN'T 
12 SAY IT BECAUSE I WAS CRITICAL OF THE SURGERY; I SAID 
13 IT BECAUSE I THOUGHT SHE HAD HER UPPER TEETH 
14 EXTRACTED, BY MY PAST HISTORY WITH HER AND HER POOR 
15 DENTAL HEALTH AND BASICALLY BAD TEETH WITH A LOT OF 
.6 DECAY. 
17 Q. ANY OTHER DOCTORS YOU HEARD FROM ABOUT THIS 
18 CASE IN AND YOUR CARE? 
19 A. YES. I HEARD FROM DR. WOLFORD. 
10 Q. DID HE CALL YOU? 
11 A. HE CALLED ME. 
12 I Q. DID HE GAVE YOU INFORMATION UPON WHICH ONE 
13 IN YOUR PROFESSION WOULD REASONABLY AND CUSTOMARILY 
14 RELY IN FORMING OPINIONS ABOUT THE CARE THAT WAS 
15 RENDERED IN THIS CASE? 
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A. DR. WOLFORD CALLED ME ON THE PHONE AFTER H 
HAD RECEIVED NOTICE THAT HE WAS PROBABLY GOING TO 
HAVE HIS DEPOSITION TAKEN IN THIS CASE. WHICH WAS 
IN MARCH OF THIS YEAR. AND I WAS KIND OF SURPRISED 
ACTUALLY, TO SEE THAT HE HAD CALLED ME, BECAUSE TO 
THIS POINT I HAD NOT TALKED TO DR. WOLFORD AT ALL 
ABOUT THIS CASE. 
Q. HAD YOU EVER MET HIM? 
A. NO. 
Q. GO AHEAD. 
A. AND WHAT HE TOLD ME WAS -- IS THAT HE--
FIRST OF ALL, HE WANTED TO KNOW SOME OTHER 
INFORMATION ABOUT THIS CASE, ESPECIALLY IF HE WAS 
GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE HIS DEPOSITION TAKEN. 
AND SO AT THAT POINT I SAID TO HIM, 
"DID YOU REALIZE THAT THIS PATIENT, WHEN SHE CAME TC 
ME, COMPLAINED OF BIMAXILLARY PROTRUSION, OF HAVING 
THE FACIAL APPEARANCE OF QUOTE LIKE A MONKEY, AND 
SHE HAD SIX MILLIMETERS OF OVERJET BETWEEN THE 
ANTERIOR MAXILLA AND MANDIBULAR TEETH? 
AND HE SAID NO. HE SAID, "I TOLD 
DOTTIE SCHMIDT WHEN SHE CAME TO SEE ME THAT THERE 
HAD NOT BEEN MALPRACTICE ON MY PART OR ANY OF THE 
CARE THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY -- SHE HAD PREVIOUSLY 
RECEIVED, AS FAR AS HER ORTHODONTIC AND SURGICAL 
CARE." 
HE SAID, "I TOLD HER, I SAYS, WHAT YOU 
REQUESTED FROM DR. WALKER AND DR. JOHNSON IS EXACTLY 
OPPOSITE OF WHAT YOU'RE NOW REQUESTING FROM ME." HE 
SAID, "TO MY KNOWLEDGE, AND WHAT I SEE OF YOUR 
RECORDS AND X-RAYS", HE SAYS, "THERE HAS NOT BEEN 
MALPRACTICE COMMITTED HERE." 
HE SAID, "DOCTOR WALKER DID ONE THING, 
AND I DID SOMETHING ELSE, AND I DID THIS BASED ON 
WHAT THE PATIENT REQUESTED, AND HIS TREATMENT WAS 
DIFFERENT THAN MINE. BASED ON TWO DIFFERENT 
PROBLEMS." 
Q. DID HE AT ALL DISCUSS WITH YOU PSYCHIATRIC 
OR PSYCHOLOGICAL INFORMATION HE RECEIVED FROM 
MS. SCHMIDT? 
A. ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. HE SAID HE 
UNDERSTOOD SOME OF HER PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY AND SOME 
OF HER PROBLEMS. AND HE SAID. "I THINK THAT SHE IS 
GOING TO BE A VERY DIFFICULT CASE TO EVER BE HAPPY 
WITH HER RESULT." 
AND HE SAID "I HOPE THAT EVENTUALLY 
SHE'S HAPPY WITH MY RESULT." BUT HE SAYS, "I HAVE 
REAL CONCERNS THAT SHE WILL BE ON A LONG TERM BASIS, 
BUT I DON'T WANT TO BE IN SAME SITUATION YOU'RE IN 
RIGHT NOW." 
Q. DID YOU AT ALL PRESSURE, INTIMIDATE, 
SUTTEST, OR ASK DR. WOLFORD NOT TO TESTIFY IN THIS 
CASE, NOT TO COME TO UTAH, ANYTHING ALONG THOSE 
LINES? 
A. NO. I DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER HE WAS COMING OR 
HE WASN'T COMING. 
Q. LET'S GO THROUGH THE REST OF THEIR 
ALLEGATIONS AND FINISH UP, DOCTOR. REFER TO THE 
ALLEGATIONS THAT YOU LEFT MS. SCHMIDT WITH A FLAT, 
DISHED-IN, SUNKEN AND CANTED APPEARANCE. HOW WOULD 
YOU RESPOND TO THAT ALLEGATION? 
A. I WOULD SAY THAT'S FALSE. MS. SCHMIDT 
POSTOPERATIVELY HAD A FACIAL PROFILE, HOLDAWAY H. 
ANGLE OF 8 DEGRESS, WHICH IS RIGHT ON THE MONEY. 
PREOPERATIVELY, AS MR. JENSEN HAS 
STATED, HE SAID SHE DIDN'T NEED THE SURGERY, SHE WAS 
QUOTE SLIGHTLY PROTRUSIVE, AND THAT IS FALSE. SHE 
WAS AT LEAST MODERATELY BIMAXILLARY PROTRUSIVE. 
HER PREOPERATIVE VALUE ON HOLDAWAY 
ANALYSIS WAS 13.5. HER INCISORS, BOTH MAXILLARY AND 
MANDIBULAR INCISORS, WERE WAY AHEAD OF THE A.P.L. 
LINE, AND SHE WAS CLEARLY BIMAXILARRY PROTRUSIVEL. 
ONE OTHER THING OUGHT TO BE STATED 
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CLEAR TO THIS JURY, AND I THINK 
YOU NEED TO KNOW THAT IF DOTTIE SCHMIDT WAS SO HAPPY 
ACKNOWLEDGED IN THE LITERATURE AS BIMAXILLARY 
PROTRUSIVENESS? 
A. IN JANUARY --
Q. WHERE YOU HAVE A HARD TIME CLOSING YOUR 
MOUTH AND YOU SHOW A L J?1 OP TEETH AND GUMS? 
A. SHE HAD MODERATE BIMAXILLARY PROTRUSION. 
Q. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH DR. GUERNSEY THAT SHE 
DID NOT HAVE BIMAXILLARY PROTRUSIVENESS? 
A. NO, I DON'T AGREE WITH THAT. 
Q. DID SHE HAVE-- WAS SHE SHOWING AN EXCESSIVE 
AMOUNT OF TEETH AND HER GUM AND HAVING A HARD TIME 
CLOSING HER LIP? THE LIP, I THINK -- DID YOU MARK 
THAT ON YOUR RECORDS? 
A. NO, I DIDN'T '1ARK IT ON MY RECORD AT THAT 
TIME. THAT HAD ALREAD" BEEN DETERMINED BY DR. 
JOHNSON. 
Q. BUT YOU HAD A DUTY TO DETERMINE THAT IN 
THAT YOUR RECORDS, TOO; RIGHT? BEFORE YOU PLANNED 
SURGERY? 
A. WELL, CAN WE SAY SOMETHING ABOUT THIS, 
JUDGE? 
THE COURT: I THINK YOU MIGHT AS WELL. 
I'VE INDICATED WHAT MY RULING WAS IN RELATION TO 
THIS LETTER. DO YOU WANT TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS, 
COUNSEL, IN RELATION TO THE LETTER? 
21 
MR. JENSEN: WELL-
MR. RENCHER: LET ME MAKE THE COMMENT: 
THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENC : THROUGHOUT THIS TRIAL THAT 
SHE HAD FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO MAKE CHOICES IN REGARD 
5 I TO HER DENTAL CARE. AND THAT FINANCIAL PRESSURE WAS 
6 THE THING THAT MOTIVATED THE LETTER. 
7 MR. JENSEN: '7ELL, YOUR HONOR, I -- MAY I 
8 TAKE EXCEPTION TO THAT FROM THE EVIDENCE? 
9 THE COURT: YOU CAN TAKE EXCEPTION HOWEVER 
10 YOU WANT, MR. JENSEN. THE LETTER WAS MOTIVATED--
11 YOU'RE THE ONE THAT BROUGHT THIS UP, SO TAKE ALL THE 
12 EXCEPTIONS YOU WANT, AND JUST STATE WHAT YOU WANT. 
13 BUT THE LETTER WAS MOTIVATED BECAUSE SHE HAD A 
14 BELIEF THAT HER INSURANCE COVERAGE WAS GOING TO 
15 i, TERMINATE AT A CERTAIN TIME. AND THAT TERMINATION 
16 j CAUSED HER TO WANT TO BE SURE THAT THIS CONDITION 
17 WOULD BE COVERED UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY. 
18 MR. JENSEN: YOUR HONOR, MAY I RESPECTFULLY 
19 TAKE THE STRONGEST EXCEPTION I CAN THAT THERE IS NO 
2 0 EVIDENCE OF THAT FACT. 
21 THE COURT: WELL, YOU WILL HAVE TO ARGUE 
22 IT. BUT THE LETTER WAS MOTIVATED FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
2 3 OBTAINING A PRIOR APPROVAL FROM THE INSURANCE 
24 CUMPANY. IS THAT CORRECT, MR. JENSEN? 
25 MR. JENSEN: NO, THAT IS NOT CORRECT. 
2_2_ 
1 THE COURT: WHO WAS IT WRITTEN TO? 
2 MR. JENSEN: TO THE INSURANCE COMPANY BY 
3 DR. WALKER. THERE IS NO SUCH EVIDENCE THAT THAT WAS 
4 HIS MOTIVATION OR MS. SCHMIDT'S MOTIVATION. 
5 THE COURT: THE MOTIVATION OF THE PARTIES 
6 MAY REMAIN A FACT IN DISPUTE. I WILL LET YOU DEAL 
7 WITH THAT. YOU CAN DEAL WITH THAT THROUGH THE 
8 WITNESSES. 
9 NEVERTHELESS, SHE ASKED HIM, AFTER THE ONE 
10 VISIT WITH HIM IN SEPTEMBER --IN NOVEMBER SHE ASKED 
11 HIM TO WRITE THE LETTER TO GET PRIOR APPROVAL FOR 
12 THAT SURGERY, AND THAT LETTER WAS TO HER INSURANCE 
13 COMPANY. 
14 MR. JENSEN: YOUR HONOR, WE NEED TO ADDRESF 
15 A MATTER TO THE COURT. 
16 THE COURT: THAT'S FINE. GO AHEAD AND 
17 CONTINUE YOUR EXAMINATION. 
18 MR. JENSEN: I NEED TO MAKE IT -- TO 
19 PROTECT MYSELF? 
2 0 THE COURT: WE'LL EXCUSE THE JURY FOR JUST 
21 A MINUTE. I 
22 MR. JENSEN: IT WILL TAKE JUST A MINUTE. 
23 (JURY EXCUSED FROM COURTROOM. PROCEEDINGS 
24 CONTINUE IN ABSENCE OF JURY.) J 
25 MR. JENSEN: MAY THE RECORD REFLECT, YOUR 
22. 
1 HONOR, THAT I RESPECTFULLY MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL ON 
2 THE GROUNDS OF THE COURT'S ERFONEOUS STATEMENT. THE 
3 COURT'S ERRONEOUS STATEMENT JUST MADE WITH RESPECT 
4 TO EVIDENCE THAT IS NOT BEFORE THE COURT, WHICH I 
5 ASSUME WILL BE THE ARGUMENT OF DR. WALKER AND HIS 
6 COUNSEL. BUT TO CLOTHE IT WI1H THE RULING OF THE 
7 COURT THAT THAT'S A FACT NOW TO THIS JURY, THAT THE 
8 ONLY REASON HE WROTE THIS LETTER WAS TO PROTECT MS. 
9 SCHMIDT'S INSURANCE RIGHTS TO SURGERY IS NOT BASED 
10 ON ANY EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. 
11 AND IS SO DETRIMENTAL TO THE INTERESTS OF 
12 THE FAIR PRESENTATION OF THE FLAINTIFF'S POSITIO ON 
13 THIS THAT WE MUST AGAIN REGRETFULLY MOVE FOR A 
14 MISTRIAL. 
15 THE COURT: I HAVE RULED THROUGHOUT THE 
16 ENTIRETY OF THIS CASE THAT YOU MAY NOT REFER TO THE 
17 INSURANCE AS IT WOULD APPLY TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
18 THIS CASE. AND ALL THROUGHOUT THE CASE EVERYBODY 
19 HAS BEEN REFERRING TO FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND 
2 0 FINANCIAL COMPUNCTIONS. 
21 NOW YOU'RE THE ONE THAT HAS CHOSEN TO GO 
2 2 THROUGH THIS EXAMINATION AND ATTEMPT TO CREATE A 
2 3 PICTURE AS TO THE MOTIVATION THAT WILL -- UNDER THE 
24 THEORY OF THE RULING THAT I WILL NOT ALLOW ANYTHING 
2 5 TO REFER TO INSURANCE COVERAGE -- AND YOU WANT TO 
_2JL 
1 MAKE THIS APPEAR AS THOUGH THF DOCTOR WAS MOTIVATED 
2 TO DO THIS INDEPENDENTLY. 
3 THE EVIDENCE DOESN'T SUSTAIN THAT. THE 
4 DOCTOR WAS CONTACTED IN HIS OFFICE, ONE TIME, BY THE 
5 PLAINTIFF, BEFORE THE LETTER WAS ASKED TO BE SENT. 
6 HE WAS ASKED TO SEND THE LETTF^. AT THE TIME WHEN 
7 HE'S, ACCORDING TO HIS OWN TESTIMONY, HE HAD 
8 ANTICIPATED SHE WAS RETURNING TO ORTHODONTIC CARE 
9 AND THAT SHE COULD HAVE HAD THIS RESOLVED SOLELY BY 
10 ORTHODONTIC CARE. 
11 NOW, HE DIDN'T PRECIPITATE THE CONTACT FROM 
12 HER. SHE DID IT BECAUSE SHE KNEW THAT SHE MAY NOT 
13 BE ABLE TO PAY FOR THIS SURGERY IF SHE WANTED IT TO 
14 BE DONE, UNLESS SHE ASKED FOR IT WITHIN THE COBRA 
15 PROTECTION PERIOD. AND THAT BECOMES A FACTOR THAT, 
16 BY YOUR EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS, AND YOUR METHOD 
17 OF EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS HAS BECOME A RELEVANT 
18 FACT IN THIS CASE. 
19 I CANNOT ALLOW A WITNESS TO SIT ON THE 
2 0 STAND AND BE REQUIRED TO - - SHE HAD FINANCIAL 
21 MOTIVATIONS. HE HAD NO MOTIVATION WHATSOEVER TO 
22 WRITE THE LETTER, WERE IT NOT ^OR HER REQUEST. 
23 MR. JENSEN: YOUR HONOR, THERE IS NO 
24 PROBLEM WITH ADDRESSING THAT. IT'S THE COURT'S 
2 5 TELLING THE JURY THAT IS A FACT. I MEAN, THAT'S 
2_5_ 
1 THE ONLY REASON. AND WE HAVEN T EVEN -- THERE IS NO 
2 EVIDENCE ON COBRA FOR THIS ISSUE IN THIS CASE. 
3 THERE IS NO EVIDENCE, BUT THERE'S BEEN --
4 YET. YOU'RE ANTICIPATING IT, BUT THERE IS NO 
5 EVIDENCE. 
6 THE COURT: THERE'S BEEN NO EVIDENCE 
7 BECAUSE I HAVE DISALLOWED IT. THERE'S MULTIPLE 
8 CONVERSATIONS WITH COUNSEL ALL THE WAY ALONG, 
9 MOTIONS IN LIMINE, MOTIONS TO AVOID APPROACHING THIS 
10 DISCUSSION. THAT HAS BEEN REPLETE FROM THE VERY 
11 BEGINNING OF THIS CASE. 
12 THE DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY HAS REQUESTED THAT 
13 THEY BE ALLOWED TO TALK ABOUT THESE THINGS. I HAVE 
14 DENIED THOSE REQUESTS ALL THE WAY ALONG UNTIL YOU 
15 CREATE THE PROTECTION -- YOU WANT TO CREATE THE 
16 APPEARANCE TO THE JURY THAT THIS LETTER IS SOMEHOW 
17 MOTIVATED BECAUSE THIS DOCTOR HAD CONCLUDED THAT 
18 THAT WAS THE COURSE OF TREATMENT. AND THEN YOU WANT 
19 TO HAVE THAT. YOU JUST SAID EXACTLY --
2 0 MR. JENSEN: EXACTLY. THAT'S MY RIGHT. 
21 THE COURT: AND YOU WANT TO PRESENT THAT TO 
22 THE JURY WITHOUT LETTING THE DOCTOR TESTIFY AT ALL 
2 3 ABOUT WHAT HIS REAL MOTIVATION WAS AND WHO 
24 PRECIPITATED IT. THAT IS INEQUITABLE TO THE DOCTOR, 
2 5 AND I WON'T ALLOW IT. 
2_6_ 
1 MR. JENSENs I HAVEN'T ASKED TO PREVENT THE 
2 DOCTOR FROM TESTIFYING. AS TO HIS MOTIVATION. I 
3 HAVEN'T OBJECTED TO -- WE HAVEN'T ADDRESSED IT. WE 
4 HAVEN'T GOTTEN TO THAT POINT, YOUR HONOR. 
5 THE COURT: WELL, YOUR MOTION --
6 MR. JENSEN: BUT THE COURT HAS ALREADY 
7 INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT'S THE REASON IT WAS DONE. 
8 THE COURT: I'LL LET THE EVIDENCE FALL THE 
9 WAY IT MAY. IF I HAVE MADE A MISTAKE, THAT'S FINE. 
10 DO YOU WISH TO BE HEARD ON THAT ARGUMENT? 
11 MR. RENCHER: I THING THE COURT HAS CLEARLY 
12 POINTED OUT THAT MY HANDS HAVE BEEN TIED TO LAY THE 
13 VERY FOUNDATION, WHICH IS FOUNDATION TO THE OPTION 
14 TO THE COURT AND TO COUNSEL AND I THINK TO THE JURY. 
15 I THINK THIS IS THE EQUITABLE APPROACH. 
16 THE COURT: OKAY. THEN THE MOTION FOR A 
17 MISTRIAL IS DENIED AND WE'LL RECALL THE JURY. 
18 (JURY RETURNS TO COURTROOM. PROCEEDINGS 
19 CONTINUE IN PRESENCE OF JURY.) 
2 0 THE COURT: YOU CAN EXAMINE THE WITNESS ANY 
21 WAY YOU WISH. 
22 MR. JENSEN: I'D ASK THE COURT INSTRUCT THE 
2 3 JURY THAT THE COURT'S COMMENTS ABOUT WHAT THE 
24 EVIDENCE IS AND THE MOTIVATION OF DR. WALKER WAS 
25 INAPPROPRIATE. 
